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In The Guardian, 2018-12-13, historian Timothy Garton Ash asks the EU27:

“(…) all we need from you, my friends, is a clear, simple, positive message, without ifs or buts: “We want you to stay!””

The EU27 already said this, before this plea actually. Yet, let me offer my fellow citizen apologies to the British people for the misconduct by the EU27 leadership. The EU27 has not been clear enough. It has allowed itself to get infected by the irresponsibility by the UK leadership.

An issue between Member States

The EU is a union of Member States and an arrangement between governments. The EU is no usual democracy with a direct relationship between EU citizens and their collective EU government. The EU27 regard Brexit as an internal affair of the UK. EU President Donald Tusk chairs meetings of government leaders, and would see himself entirely out of place when he would tour the UK and have Town Hall sessions trying to resolve misunderstandings and pleading the common cause. Brexiteers would accuse him of meddling in internal affairs, and Tusk could only confirm this. Many Britons would see him as another Pole who should depart as soon as possible, even when he would be excellent at taking care at hospital beds or fixing the plumbing.

Clear and convincing evidence that the UK is under the spell of populism

The 2016 Referendum is clear and convincing evidence, acceptable in a decent criminal court, that the UK is under the spell of populism. In proper democracy it is Parliament that decides such issues. Who studies the mathematics of democracy can better appreciate the history that it are mostly demagogues and incompetents who resort to referenda to create the illusion as if the “will of the people” has been called upon. The 2016 Referendum was an exercise in populist lunacy and the UK government has been irresponsible concerning it. Prime Minister Theresa May clearly doesn’t have the background to understand this. In this particular respect she is no better than Silvio Berlusconi though with a feeling for understatement and a stiff upper lip, and she rather follows populism in the UK instead of steering her country out of it.

Stab-in-the-Back Myth

In this political setting, anything that the EU27 says can and basically will be used against it. The EU27 has been cautious about the risk of a Stab-in-the-Back Myth that the EU27 would be at fault for the mess that the UK is in and could be in for coming decades. When the EU27 would state with more emphasis that it would rather have the UK remain, like Garton Ash suggests, then this would likely be misrepresented as a ploy to lure the virgin UK into a place of darkness and unspeakable horror.

Take the bull by the horns

In real politik the EU27 accepted that a Member State succombed to populism. They should have been wiser. Alongside the unavoidable negotiations, the EU27 should also have discussed How to Deal with Populism in a Member State. EU scientists with basic impartiality in Town Hall meetings could have invited Britons to see this true diagnosis and monster eye to eye. It is still not too late. I myself have looked into the deeper causes of Brexit. My finding is that Britons think that they have democracy while the UK has only proto-democracy. The UK has district representation instead of equal proportionality. The UK system has been causing problems in the UK for a good part of last century, and Brexit is only a culmination.

A second referendum is populism all-over again

Garton Ash’s second referendum is populist irresponsibility all-over again. He neglects the evidence of the 2016 disaster and believes in a heaven of well designed referenda that disclose the “will of the people” like an Oracle of Delphi. His world view is locked in proto-democracy, and he doesn’t even notice the prison walls.

The advice is a moratorium

My suggestion is a Moratorium on Brexit of two years, so that the UK can discuss and improve its democracy. See the former weblog entry.

 

Wikimedia commons May and Berlusconi

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The EU-May Brexit agreement – between the EU27 and UK prime minister Theresa May of November 25 2018 – makes me think about the French quote: “C’est pire qu’un crime, c’est une faute.”

The EU treats Brexit as an issue between Member States, and thus neglects that Britons are citizens of the EU, perhaps not in a legal sense – see this campaign – but in terms of the ideals why the EU was created in the first place. The EU doesn’t protect these citizens from dysfunction in London. The UK irresponsibility has infected the EU too.

Many will regard the EU-May deal as practical. John Maynard Keynes stated:

“Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”

The Great Depression in the 1930s came about because economists had confusions about the gold standard and such. For this 2018 irresponsibility by UK and EU, who are the present academic scribblers ? Today the universities of the world show incompetence or gross negligence in particular on Brexit and in general on “political science on electoral systems” (including referenda). This latter branch at the Academia has been misguiding mankind for the greater part of last century.

The road to reason on Brexit is to observe and tackle this misguidance and mis-education on democracy. The partial rationality of working within EU conventions better is ended. The EU and UK better adopt an inclusive rationality and stop this nonsense and disaster.

UK democracy: Garbage In, Garbage Out

The 2016 Brexit Referendum Question itself did not fit the basic requirements of a statistical questionnaire. Thus we got “garbage in, garbage out” (GIGO). The 2017 UK General Election contest was with the UK system of district representation (DR) instead of equal proportional representation (EPR). The system of DR distorts voter views so that we again have GIGO.

Thus we do not know what UK voters want. It is rather damning for a claimed democracy like the UK that its main two instruments of democracy do not generate clarity on what the people want.

The UK political machinery runs its course but this machinery is proto-democracy based upon GIGO rather than proper democracy. The policy makers themselves have a role too but basically they only add colour to the canvas of history. The true culprits are the Academia that haven’t advised the UK at an early moment last century to switch from DR to EPR. Sweden switched in 1907 and Holland in 1917. Observe that a country with EPR doesn’t need a referendum. Now, what is wrong at the Academia ?

A time-out to investigate the role by the Academia

Let Brussels and London take a time-out on Brexit, and let the Parliaments within the European Union ask questions to their Academia, before decisions are implemented that will wreak havoc on generations to come, and that will undermine the ideals of the European Union. Let Parliaments investigate and expose the role of the Academia on Brexit, and let the Parliaments ask the questions that our collected scientists and scholars better answer, and on which they are dodging their responsibility of disinforming and mis-educating the world.

The evidence is available at MPRA 84482

As an econometrician (Groningen 1982) and teacher of mathematics (Leiden 2008) I may be a lone voice, but I adhere to the principles of science, and fellow scientists can check the evidence that I have collected and made accessible. The evidence is at the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) paper 84482.

I have observed that the branch of “political science on electoral systems” (including referenda) is still locked in the humanities, and thus no science, and thus for its empirical claims comparable to astrology, alchemy and homeopathy. I invite the Academia to set up national buddy-systems of scientists and scholars to check the evidence. Scientists tend to know little about democracy. Scholars tend to know little about empirics. Thus buddies can complement each other. Parliaments may encourage the Academia to create such systems.

Readers are advised to start with this summary on the USA midterm 2018 that uses three novel statistical analyses that are missing in the “political science” literature, and that show that more than a third of US voters have taxation without representation, while the Boston Tea Party had the slogan “No taxation without representation”.

Precision of the kilogram versus vagueness of “representative”

Scientists redefined the kilogram recently to greater and perhaps universal precision but the scholars on democracy and politics still use everyday terms like “election” and “representative” of which the meanings depend upon national jurisdictions. A “Head of State” can be a President or a Queen but their roles are different empirically. A key example are (district) representation (DR) in the USA, UK and France and (equal proportional) representation (EPR) in Holland and Scandinavia. An introductory chapter or section of a politicological book tends to explain that these are “different forms of democracy” but when statistical analysis becomes a bit more complicated then the distinction between apples and oranges appears to be forgotten. Scientists know about “garbage in, garbage out”, but the politicological scholars take the everyday language garbage as the undisputed foundation for their treatises and their textbooks to indoctrinate their students. The American Political Science Association (APSA) was founded in 1903 with an aspiration and not with a verified tradition that it was a science. The British Political Studies Association (PSA) has an accurate name but its members may still claim positions as “professor in political science”. Renowned academics pontificate on electoral outcomes and referenda, while not knowing what they are speaking about, with a sprinkling of math, statistics and computers that only suggest science, but they are still scholars locked in the humanities that basically concentrate upon maintaining tradition.

A game-changing insight

This diagnosis may remind of familiar discussions about DR versus EPR. However, it is a game-changing discovery that this branch “political science on electoral systems” is pseudo-science. It is like the difference between a flat Earth and a globe. All claims need to be re-evaluated. This causes the proposal of the buddy-system.

Elephant in the room

Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker for the EU and Theresa May for the UK have clarified that the EU has made its final offer, and that the current UK executive branch agrees with it. A vote by the UK House of Commons is intended for December 10 to 12, with a European Council already scheduled for December 13 and 14. If the UK House of Commons doesn’t take the deal then the UK will crash out of the EU on March 29 2018. If the UK takes it then there still is a transition period with further negotiations. If the transition doesn’t result into a final agreement then the UK will remain in a customs union without a seat at the table. Potentially the UK takes the deal now and crashes out much later anyway, or perhaps re-applies again but then without its current perks.

The present situation creates economic uncertainty. This likely reduces investments and creates stagnation, and this may play into resentment in the UK that the EU sabotages it, even though the UK is itself responsible for the conundrum at the Irish border. There is a serious risk of a Stab-in-the-Back Myth, holding that the original “outcome” of the 2016 Referendum is not respected. This Myth doesn’t recognise that this “outcome” was GIGO, but can still be a myth. Illusions in the UK of “having your cake and eat it” now meet with reality, and rather than accept reality a frustrated people might find it easier to blame the EU.

The EU and UK are surprisingly vague on the option of Bregret, i.e. that the UK retracts the invoking of Article 50. Theresa May mentioned it briefly in the UK House of Commons, and Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron have not rejected it. The main reason for this vagueness must be political caution, namely not to spend attention to the elephant in the room. The EU and May (originally for Remain) might be depicted as targeting Bregret by designing a deal that the UK House of Commons would reject. This image would play into the Stab-in-the-Back Myth.

However, it is a Mission Impossible not to speak about Bregret. The topic would surface one way or another. To evade the topic is irresponsible, unless you really accept the prospect of a stagnating and ever more resentful UK, and unless you really believe in a EU of Member States only, without responsibility for Britons who are citizens of the EU too.

Addendum. Owen Jones in The Guardian 2018-11-28 warns about a Stab-in-the-Back Myth whether the UK takes the May-EU deal or rejects it. On December 9 there will be a Great Britain Betrayal protest in London and Jones calls for a counter-march. This again frames the issue as one of political preferences while the true problem is information.

Solution approach

When the proposed buddy-system has generated their findings, it is not unlikely that the UK switches to EPR and can have proper elections so that all voices in the UK are duly represented, finally for the first time. Parties can split along their Brexit views in order to offer voters the full spectrum. The Stab-in-the-Back Myth has less risk of developing when all people can see the true proportions of the different views on Brexit. With new elections, the House of Commons can finally start from proper proportions to negotiate between parties for a compromise. Compromises would focus on internal UK affairs, since there are no more negotiations with the EU. Options are the May-EU deal, Crash, and if possible return to the Status Quo Ex Ante if the EU allows. Potentially the EU would allow the UK time for such a fundamental reconsideration of its system of democracy and relation to the EU.

With this advised solution approach, it may still be that the UK leaves the EU perhaps in 2021 but at least then all votes have been treated properly, with prudence, justice, dignity and compassion, in equal proportion.

Disclaimer: I did not read the EU-May Deal but looked at abstracts.
Some parts of this text have been used earlier.

Angela Merkel throws a tear to Theresa May (Channel 4 screen shot)

In August 2017 I discovered that “political science on electoral systems” still is locked in the humanities and thus no real science.

  • This field of study has been disinforming the world for a greater part of last century, see here.
  • The 2018 USA midterm election contests are an example that the system of district representation (DR) that the USA, UK and France use is only proto-democractic. More than a third of US voters have taxation without representation, see here.
  • Readers might find this interview by Protesilaos Stavrou enlightening on the choice between parliamentarian democracy and populism with referenda.
  • See information on (i) the 2016 UK Referendum Question here, republished at the LSE Brexit blog here, (ii) YouGov data on UK voter preferences on Brexit here, and (iii) the UK confusion on democracy and statistics here.

The UK has proto-democracy and no proper democracy

It is rather damning for a claimed democracy like the UK that its main two instruments of democracy – the general election contests of 2015 and 2017 and the referendum of 2016 – do not generate clarity on what the people really want. Currently there are calls for a new general election contest or a second referendum as if these already failed methods would finally produce the miracle that everyone is hoping for. Instead, the UK could switch to equal proportional representation (EPR). This system provides clarity by its very mechanics and has no need for referenda. EPR creates the mentality of seeking compromises in the House of Commons (or the EU itself), while voters themselves obviously cannot do such bargaining in the voting booth. The UK is no stranger to EPR because this is used for the European Parliament so that Nigel Farage got a seat there. UKIP with its 12.5% of the vote got only 1 seat in the 2015 House of Commons, which is about when and where the situation started to become chaotic.

Three options: May-EU deal, No Deal, or return to Status Quo Ex Ante

Now that there is a Brexit deal at the level of government, the EU has stopped bargaining with the UK. Accepting the May-EU deal is Option A, and rejecting it with a No Deal is Option B. Likely the EU may still allow the UK time for a fundamental reconsideration of its democratic processes, including such EPR reconsideration of the UK relation to the EU. The EU might perhaps allow a return to the Status Quo Ex Ante before the invoking of article 50, because of the fact that this was invoked under a failing system of proto-democracy only. This would be Option C. Formally it might seem that there are three options on the table then. A referendum might present voters with the six preference orders A > B > C, …., C > B > A, and each voter could indicate the preferred order. However, each option comes with complications. Options A or B might cause Scotland to depart from the UK, so actually these would split into four options. Option C might be painted in a stronger or weaker role for the UK, depending upon one wishes for more federalism or a Europe of the Nations. Referenda can never cover this complexity, which is where the strength of parliamentarian democracy comes from.

Michael Portillo warns for resentment with wrong reason: resentment itself

Carrie Fisher (Burbank 1956 – Los Angeles 2016), or Princess Leia in the Star Wars films, once stated:

“Resentment is like drinking a poison and waiting for the other person to die.”

On BBC This Week, November 16, Michael Portillo stated:

“I think the European Union has made a substantial (…) strategic error, short of marching Mrs May into a railway carriage in Compiègne Forest, they could not have produced a more humiliating surrender. And all of history (…) tells us that when you humiliate countries with a surrender, it doesn’t go well thereafter.” (here)

Portillo intends to remind us about Versailles after WW1, that created German resentment that led to WW2. Indeed, imagine a UK locked in economic stagnation with such resentment. Awkwardly, Portillo’s statement already is such expression of resentment itself. The UK has fallen into its own sword and fails to face up to its own responsibility for its current chaos. Blaiming the EU for not solving the Northern Ireland border issue is curious when the UK created this border.

Avoid a Stab-in-the-Back Myth

Let the UK make the proper diagnosis before applying treatment. Having a proto-democracy bottles up discontent that can explode in strange manners. The best way to avoid a Stab-in-the-Back Myth is to switch to EPR so that all voices in the UK are duly represented, finally for the first time. Parties can split along their Brexit views in order to offer voters the full spectrum. Then the House of Commons can finally start from proper proportions to bargain for a compromise. Basic options are the May-EU deal, No Deal, and if possible return to the Status Quo Ex Ante (retract the invoking of article 50) if the EU allows. These options however have colours and shades. Compromises would focus on internal UK affairs, like compensation for those suffering from the final decision. (The UK also has a referendum lock but in Holland such major decisions rather require new elections and then agreement by the new parliament, see here.)

Hopefully the UK chooses for a role in the EU

The Dutch government has stated that it would want to see the UK within the EU. Let the UK not feel itself be unwelcome or unappreciated. The UK might regard itself as an island apart from the Continent but then it might forget that shipping is the cheapest way of mass transport, and that the UK has been at the core of European development even in the Bronze Age, with its supply of tin. The UK was victorious w.r.t. Napoleon, WW1 and WW2, and should be able to be victorious against the ghosts of the past.

NB. The EU can use UK comedians too: compliments for James Acaster’s tea bag analogy, here.

PS. A bias has been created against EPR

The discussion in the UK about EPR can be biased.

(1) The BBC has the following GCSE test bit on how the German nazis took power in 1933:

“Proportional representation – instead of voting for an MP, like we do in Britain, Weimar Germans voted for a party. Each party was then allocated seats in the Reichstag exactly reflecting (proportional’ to) the number of people who had voted for it. This sounds fair, but in practice it was a disaster it resulted in dozens of tiny parties, with no party strong enough to get a majority, and, therefore, no government to get its laws passed in the Reichstag. This was a major weakness of the Republic.” (here)

This is a gross misrepresentation. The nazis were handed power by big corporations and finance, see Henry Turner’s “Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power”. David Kennedy’s “Freedom from fear” clarifies that Huey Long might have turned the USA into fascism too except that FDR made some wise moves. FDR might have had it easier with EPR. EPR was also introduced in Sweden in 1907 and Holland 1917 and those are amongst the happiest countries in the world. EPR is only an element in the full story but a key element. In Germany after WW2 they chose for EPR with a higher threshold rather than DR. Times are different now too. Do not forget the failure of economic policy w.r.t. the German Hyperinflation in the 1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s: we now do a bit better with economic planning. (See here.)

(2) The UK in 1884 saw the foundation of the Proportional Representation Society, now the Electoral Reform Society (ERS). While Dutch democracy uses open party lists, that allow voters to express preference e.g. for a regional candidate (though few voters actually use this option), the UK reformers got off track in a desire for misconceived mathematical perfection. The ERS idea is that voters rank candidates, so that when a candidate is not elected then the ranking can be used. This “single transferable vote” (STV) system is also applied to districts, to win over minds indoctrinated on DR. The ERS claims that their system is EPR but it isn’t. The method is cumbersome while districts are distractive for preferences on national policy. The ERS misconceptions helped cause the disaster of the 2011 referendum on the “Alternative Vote” that is not EPR either. (here) The ERS is a major cause of confusion and the UK better seeks information about EPR from Holland and Sweden. This again comes with the warning that “political science on electoral systems” is no science yet, so that one must head advice from that field of study anyway. Thus my proposal of a buddy-system of scientists and “political scientists”.

(3) The combination of points (1) and (2) can be found in Doug Cowan’s discussion at the ERS in 2015 whether EPR  put the nazis into power. The very point that the nazis needed a coup (arresting communist members of parliament so that they could not attend a vote, creating an artificial majority) shows that EPR was blocking them. However, Cowan then offers STV as if it were EPR, and it isn’t.

(4) Timothy Garton Ash in 2017 called a “soft” Brexit most likely, like the May-EU deal has turned out to be. In July 2018 he warned for “A humiliating Brexit deal risks a descent into Weimar Britain“. This wasn’t a novel insight since negotiators have been aware from the beginning that there might be a backlash when phantasies met reality. In comments and twitter TGA was criticised that the article could be read as playing into the Stab-in-the-Back Myth. TGA replied that he precisely wanted to prevent this narrative. It is rather a “mission impossible” to try to prevent this narrative by presenting the most likely outcome as humiliating, while the true event is a facing up to reality. Nevertheless, TGA rightly criticised Tony Blair for not adopting EPR in 1997. In his discussion of the 2011 AV referendum he unfortunately did not criticise the ERS for their disinformation on STV. One wonders what he might think about the proposal of a buddy-system for science and the humanities, and whether he might set an example.

Resonance of the American Revolution (wikimedia commons)

Let us look beyond Brexit and determine the implications w.r.t. democracy itself. We can conclude that the UK has an intellectual community that is quite blind on the very notion of democracy. When the educated run astray then there is only an anchor in the democratic notions of the whole population, and this opens the doors to what is called “populism”.

I started looking into Brexit after the surprise referendum outcome in 2016. This memo sums up my findings over the last two years. The following identifies where the educated community in the UK is in need of re-educating themselves.

Earlier in 1990-1994 I already concluded that Montesquieu’s model of the separation of powers of the Trias Politica fails in a key aspect since its conception in 1748. Democracies need the fourth power of an Economic Supreme Court, see (2014). It is necessary to mention this earlier conclusion that predates Brexit, but let us now continue with findings following Brexit.

To start with: What does the UK electorate really want w.r.t. Brexit or Bremain ? Both the Referendum of 2016 and the General Election of 2017 do not provide adequate information. One would think that it is rather damning for a claimed democracy when its procedures do not result into adequate clarity on such a fundamental issue.

The 2016 Referendum Question concerned the legal issue of Leave or Remain but was disinformative about the ways of Leaving or Remaining. The political parties that are elected into the House of Commons are split on both direction and ways as well. The overall situation can only be described as chaotic. One might try to characterise this more positively as that a population with divided views generated a House of Commons with divided views, which would be democracy itself, but this neglects that there is no information about what those divided views actually are. The true process is “garbage in, garbage out” and this doesn’t fit the definition of democracy.

The very Brexit or Bremain Referendum Question fails the criteria for a decent statistical enquiry. I am surprised that the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) did not protest. The question of Leave or Remain is a binary legal issue but the true issue are the policy options. It took some time to analyse this, but with the help of Anthony Wells of YouGov.com I managed to dissect this, see (2017abc). Some 17 per cent of voters ranked Remain between different versions of Leave, which implies a grand game of guessing what to vote for, and which means that the Referendum failed on its purpose of expression of preferences. The UK Electoral Commission missed this but it does not care about this and is happy to take the legal position. They claim to provide proper information to the general public, but what they regard as “information” is regarded by statistical science as disinformation (but the RSS is silent on this). One is reminded of Byzantium instead of claimed modernity.

The main question is why the UK had the referendum in the first place. In Holland since 1917 there is system of equal proportional representation (EPR) for the House of Commons so that referenda are not required. The UK has a system of district representation (DR) that lacks such proportionality, and that invites the confusion that referenda might be used to find out what the electorate really thinks. The latter is a confusion indeed, since it neglects the important role of bargaining, see (2017c).

This diagnosis set me on the course of investigating why the USA, UK and France have DR and not EPR. My original thought was that a party that won an election would have no reason to change a system that caused its election. This would explain why the USA, UK and France were stuck with DR and did not switch to EPR. Last year I discovered that the true cause is different. My finding for the UK is that there is an amazing blindness in the UK intellectual community. The report in (2018a) causes a chill down the spine. It appears that “political science on electoral systems” is no science yet, but still solidly within the Humanities, and alike astrology, alchemy and homeopathy. The eye-opener is that these academics use the same word “election” for both DR and EPR while they actually have entirely different meanings. In reality only EPR has proper elections fitting of proper democracy. The DR system is a proto-democracy that relies on contests. Political “science” is blind to what this means not only for proper scientific analysis but also for communication with the general public. Voters are disinformed on a grand scale, both in the textbooks in government classes and in public discussion e.g. at “election” nights.

Compare physics that also borrowed words from colloquial English, like “force” and “mass”. Yet in physics these words have recieved precise meaning. In physics, gravity in Holland has the same meaning as gravity in the UK. Political “science” uses colloquial terms like “election” and “democracy” but those meanings are not fixed. An “election” in Holland with EPR is entirely different from an “election” in the UK with DR. Political “science” thus uses terms that confuse both the academics and the public. When historians describe how the West developed into democracy, they occlude the fact that the USA, UK and France are still in a proto-democratic phase.

A first complication is: There appears to be a special role for the UK Electoral Reform Society (ERS) founded in 1884 and originally known as the Proportional Representation Society. Here we find an independent and disinterested group that criticises DR and that claims to further the UK on the historical path towards EPR. However, it appears that ERS wants a transferable vote, while their claim that transferability generates proportionality is simply false. Such distortion contributed to the debacle of the 2011 Referendum on the “alternative vote”, which is a counterproductive construct to start with. When one presents the ERS with this criticism then the reply appears to be disingenuous. Instead of a clear adoption of EPR, either in the Dutch version or like the UK elections for the EU Parliament, with their wealth of experience by actual application, one can only conclude that the ERS is addicted to this notion of a transferable vote, and they want this model at any cost. Psychology might explain how such zealotism may arise but it remains far removed from proper information for the general public.

A second complication is: There appears to exist a confusion w.r.t. the interpretation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem on democracy. In this, there is a major role for mathematicians who mainly look at models and who neglect empirical science. This leads too far for this memo, and an overview is given in (2018e).

A third complication is: There is the interference by a grand coalition of statistics and political science (with some ambiguity whether quotation marks should be used) in creating a black hole on democracy and its measurement, see (2018bcd). Political science never managed to find a good measure for the difference between vote shares and seat shares. My proposal is to use the “sine-diagonal inequality / disproportionality” (SDID) measure, that does for democracy what the Richter scale does for earthquakes. Political science has shown less understanding of statistics, or perhaps failed in finding such a measure because statistical science did not develop this theory or did not understand what the political scientists were looking for. This hole has been plugged now, see (2018bcd). Nevertheless, this diagnosis calls for a reorganisation of university courses in statistics and political science.

The enclosed graph highlights the “perfect storm” of blindness of the intellectual community that lurks behind Brexit. The figure is documented in (2018d). The main idea is that statistics and other sciences like physics, biology, psychometrics and econometrics could help “political science on electoral systems” to become a proper science. Then science can provide adequate information to the general public.

A conclusion is: The UK electoral system has “winner take all” district representation (DR) that does not provide for equal proportional representation (EPR) of what voters want. Again the word “representation” means something else for proto-democratic DR versus democratic EPR. My suggestion is that the UK switches to EPR, say adopt the Dutch system of open lists, has new elections, and let the new House discuss Brexit or Bregret again. Bregret is defined by that the House adopted Brexit before and thus might reconsider. It is not unlikely that the EU would allow the UK the time for such a fundamental reconsideration on both electoral system and Brexit.

It remains to be seen whether the UK electorate would want to stick to the current system of DR or rather switch to EPR. The first step is to provide the UK electorate with adequate information. For this, the UK intellectual community must get its act together on what this information would be. A suggestion is to check the analysis that I have provided here.

 

References

Colignatus (2014), “An economic supreme court”, RES Newsletter issue 167, October, pp. 20-21
Colignatus (2017a), “Voting theory and the Brexit referendum question”, RES Newsletter, Issue 177, April, pp. 14-16
Colignatus (2017b), “Great Britain’s June 2017 preferences on Brexit options”, RES Newsletter, Issue 177, October, http://www.res.org.uk/view/art2Oct17Features.html
Colignatus (2017c), “Dealing with Denial: Cause and Cure of Brexit”, https://boycottholland.wordpress.com/2017/12/01/dealing-with-denial-cause-and-cure-of-brexit/
Colignatus (2018a), “One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France”, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84482/
Colignatus (2018b), “Comparing votes and seats with cosine, sine and sign, with attention for the slope and enhanced sensitivity to inequality / disproportionality”, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84469/
Colignatus, (2018c), “An overview of the elementary statistics of correlation, R-Squared, cosine, sine, Xur, Yur, and regression through the origin, with application to votes and seats for parliament ”, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1227328
Colignatus, (2018d), “An overview of the elementary statistics of correlation, R-Squared, cosine, sine, Xur, Yur, and regression through the origin, with application to votes and seats for parliament (sheets)”, Presentation at the annual meeting of Dutch and Flemish political science, Leiden June 7-8, https://zenodo.org/record/1270381
Colignatus, (2018e), “The solution to Arrow’s difficulty in social choice (sheets)”, Second presentation at the annual meeting of Dutch and Flemish political science, Leiden June 7-8, https://zenodo.org/record/1269392

For our understanding of history we like to distinguish between structural developments and contingencies.

Examples of structure would be the rise of the world population and Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel. Obviously, various authors have various suggestions for what they consider to be structure, but the lack of consensus generally doesn’t matter as long as the discussion continues, and as long as people are aware that there are different points of view. It is rather tricky to identify structure for the here and now because it might require the perspective of some centuries to arrive at proper evaluation.

There are also major contingent events that shaped developments. The collapse of civilisation in 1177 BC would be a perfect storm. Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon. His Alea iacta indicates that he took a calculated risk and the outcome might have been different. If the weather had been better then perhaps the Armada had conquered England and saved the world for Catholicism.

Thus we distinguish structure and relevant and irrelevant contingency.

Brexit came with such surprise that we are still discussing how it could have happened. It very much looks like a perfect storm. The 2016 referendum result has many curious aspects. The referendum question itself doesn’t fit the requirements of a scientifically warranted statistical questionnaire – and the British Electoral Commission doesn’t mind. Even in 2017 17% of UK voters put Remain between different options for Leave, and those of them who voted Leave in 2016 might not have voted so if their preferred option might not materialise (see here). Hannes Grassegger & Mikael Krogerus point to media manipulation. Referenda are instruments of populism, and the better model of democracy is representative democracy. Chris Patten rightly remarks that the UK House of Commons had more options than Theresa May suggests:

“The Brexit referendum last June was itself a disaster. A parliamentary democracy should never turn to such populist devices. Even so, May could have reacted to the 52 per cent vote to quit Europe by saying that she would hand the negotiations to a group of ministers who believed in this outcome and then put the result of the talks in due course to parliament and the people. Instead, she turned the whole of her government into a Brexit machine, even though she had always wished to remain in the EU. Her government’s motto is now “Brexit or bust.” Sadly, we will probably get both.”

Structural cause of Brexit

My take of the structural cause of Brexit is clarified by the following table. We distinguish Euro and Non-Euro countries versus the political structures of district representation (DR) and equal or proportional representation (EPR).

District representation (DR) Equal or proportional representation (EPR)
Euro France Holland (natural quota)
Germany (threshold 5%)
Non-Euro UK (Brexit) Sweden (threshold 4%)
Norway (non-EU, threshold 4%)

Update 2018-02-27: On the distinction between DR and EPR, there are: (1) this short overview of elementary statistics with an application to votes and seats, (2) a deconstruction of the disarray in the “political science on electoral systems” (1W1V), and (3) details on the suggestion for an inequality or disproportionality measure (SDID).

In the special Brexit edition of BJPIR, Helen Thompson discusses inevitability and contingency, and concludes that the position of the UK as a non-Euro country in a predominantly Eurozone EU became politically untenable.

  • For the voters in the UK, migration was a major issue. The world financial crisis of 2007+ and the contractionary policies of the Eurozone turned the UK into a “job provider of last resort”.
  • For the political elite, the spectre of the Euro doomed large. Given the theory of the optimal currency area, the Eurozone must further integrate or break up. The UK didn’t want to join the Euro and thus found itself at the fringe of the EU, in an increasing number of issues. With the increasing loss of power and influence on developments, more and more politicians saw less and less reason to participate.

Thompson regards the economic angle as a sufficient structural cause. My take is that it is only necessary, and that another necessary element is the form of parliamentarian representation. In my recent paper One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France, with the focus on this parlementarian dimension, I forward the diagnosis that the UK political system is the main cause. Brexit is not the proof of a successful UK political system but proof of its failure.

  • The UK has district representation (DR). UKIP got 12.5% of the votes but only 1 seat in a house of 650 seats. David Cameron saw that crucial seats of his Conservatives were being challenged by UKIP. Such a threat may be amplified under DR. This explains Cameron’s political ploy to call a referendum.
  • If the UK had had equal or proportional representation (EPR), the UKIP protest vote could have been contained, and the UK would have had more scope to follow the example of Sweden (rather than Norway). Obviously, the elephant in the room of the optimal currency area for the Euro would not be resolved by this, but there would have been more time to find solutions. For example, the UK would have had a stronger position to criticise the wage moderation policies in Germany and Holland.
The structural cause of disinformation about representation

The 2007+ financial crisis highlighted irresponsible herd behaviour in economic science. Brexit highlights irresponsible herd behaviour in political science. Said paper One woman, one vote. Though not in the USA, UK and France (1W1V) shows that political science on electoral systems (on that topic specifically) is still pre-science, comparable to homeopathy, astrology and alchemy. Thus the UK finds itself in the dismal spot of being disinformed about democracy for decades.

The paper runs through the nooks and crannies of confusion and bias. At various points I was surprised by the subtleties of the particular madness. The paper is rather long but this has a clear explanation. When an argument has 100 aspects, and people understand 99% correctly and 1% wrongly, but everyone another 1%, in continuous fashion, then you really want the full picture if you want that all understand it.

But let me alert you to some points.

(1) The paper focuses on Carey & Hix (2011) on an “electoral sweet spot” of 3-8 seats per district. Particular to C&H is that they confuse “most frequent of good” with “the best“. The district magnitude of 3-8 seats appears most frequent in cases that satisfy their criteria for being good, and they turn this into the best. Since such DR would be best, say goodbye to EPR. But it is a confusion.

(2) They use fuzzy words like vote and election. But the words mean different things in DR or EPR. In DR votes are obliterated that EPR translates into seats. Using the same words for different systems, C&H suggest treatment on a par while there are strict logical differences. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights only fits with EPR. Science would use strict distinctions, like “vote in DR” and “vote in EPR”. Political science is still too close to colloquial language, and thus prone to confusion. Obviously I agree that it is difficult to define democracy, and that there are various systems, each with a historical explanation. But science requires clear terms. (See this Varieties of Democracy project, and check that they still have to do a lot too.)

(3) There is a statistical relationship between a measure of disproportionality (EGID) and a measure of the concentrated number of parties (CNP). C&H interprete the first as “interest-representation” and the latter as “accountability”. An interpretation is something else than a model. Using the statistical regularity, they claim to have found a trade-off relation between interest-representation and accountability. Instead, the scientific approach would be to try explain the statistical regularity for what it is. The suggested interpretation is shaky at best. One cannot use a statistical regularity as an argument on content and political principle (like One woman, one vote).

(4) They present a mantra, and repeat it, that there would be a trade-off between interest-representation and accountability. The best point [confusion] would be achieved at a district magnitude of 3-8 seats per district. However, they do not present a proper model and measure for accountability. My paper presents such a model, and shows that the mantra is false. Not DR but EPR is most accountable. EPR is obviously most interest-representative, so that there is no trade-off. Thus the C&H paper fails in the scientific method of modeling and measuring. It only has the method of repeating tradition and a mantra, with some magic of using interpretations. (Section 3.6 of 1W1V should start opening eyes of political scientists on electoral systems.)

(5) The C&H paper is the top of a line of research in “political science on electoral systems”. This paper fails and thus the whole line fails. Section 4.5 of 1W1V shows confusion and bias in general in political science on electoral systems, and the C&H paper is no exception to this.

The cure of Brexit

The cure of Brexit might well be that it just happens, and that we must learn to live with it. The EU lives with Norway while NATO has its Arctic training there.

Seen from the angle of the cause via the political structure, it may also be suggested that both France and the UK switch from DR to EPR, and that the newly elected UK House of Commons re-evaluates Brexit or Bregret. This switch may well cause the break-up of the parties of the Conservatives and Labour into Remain or Leave parties, but such would be the consequence of democracy and thus be fine by itself. We would no longer have Theresa May who was for Remain leading the Leavers and Jeremy Corbyn who was for Leave leading the Remainers. (For an indication, see here.) The other EU member states tend to stick to the Brexit deadline of March 29 2019, but when they observe the cause for Brexit and a new objective in the UK to deal with this (fateful) cause by switching to EPR, then this deadline might be shifted to allow the UK to make up its mind in a proper way.

Obviously, a UK switch to EPR is advisable in its own right, see said paper. It would also allow the new UK House of Commons to still adopt Brexit. The advantage of such an approach and decision would be that it would have the democratic legitimacy that is lacking now.

The relevant contingency of the Sovereignty Bill

Thompson’s article surprised me by her discussion of the 2010 UK Sovereignty Bill (that calls itself an Act). She calls it a “referendum lock”, and indeed it is. The Bill / Act states:

“2 Treaties. No Minister of the Crown shall sign, ratify or implement any treaty or law, whether by virtue of the prerogative powers of the Crown or under any statutory authority, which — (a) is inconsistent with this Act; or (b) increases the functions of the European Union affecting the United Kingdom without requiring it to be approved in a referendum of the electorate in the United Kingdom.”

The approach is comparable to the one in Ireland, in which EU treaties are subject to referenda too. In Holland, only changes in the constitution are subject to new elections and affirmation by the newly elected parliament, while treaties are exempt from this – and this is how the EU constitution of 2005 got rejected in a referendum but the Lisbon treaty got accepted in Dutch parliament. Currently a state commission is investigating the Dutch parliamentary system.

Thompson explains that the UK referendum lock had the perverse effect that EU leaders started to avoid the instrument of a treaty and started to use other ways to enact policies. For EU-minded Ireland, the instrument of a referendum was acceptable but for EU-skeptic UK the instrument was a poison pill. Why put much effort in negotiating a treaty if it could be rejected by the UK circus (partly created by its system of DR) ?

Thompson explains that while the referendum lock had been intended to enhance the UK position as a non-euro country w.r.t. eurozone UK, in effect it weakened Cameron’s position. The world noticed this and this weak position was fuel for the Brexiteers.

The relevant contingency of Thatcher’s policies

Brexit is mostly caused in the UK itself. Thompson doesn’t call attention to these relevant contingencies:

  • Margaret Thatcher started as pro-EU and even partook in the abolition of unanimity and the switch to qualified majority rule. My view is that it would have been wiser to stick to unanimity and be smarter in handling different speeds.
  • Secondly, Thatcher supported the neoliberal approach in economics that contributed to austerity and the deterioration of British industry that British voters blame the EU for. There was an obvious need for redress of earlier vulgar-Keynesian errors but there is no need to overdo it. My advice to the UK is to adopt EPR and see what can be learned from Holland and Sweden.
  • Thompson refers to her own 1996 book on the UK and ERM but doesn’t mention Bernard Connolly, his text The rotten heart of Europe and his dismissal from the EU Commission in 1995. At that time John Major had become prime minister and he did not defend Connolly’s position at the EU Commission. A country that is so easy on civil rights and free speech deserves the state that the UK is in. Surely the EU courts allowed the dismissal but this only means that one should look for better employment safeguards for critical views. Who wants to combine independent scientific advice and policy making, arrives at the notion of an  Economic Supreme Court, see below.
The relevant contingency of migration

I am reminded of the year 1988 at the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) when we looked at the Cecchini report. One criticism was that the report was too optimistic about productivity growth and less realistic on the costs of displaced workers. An observation by myself, though not further developed, was that, with more job mobility, people might prefer a single language barrier to a double one. People from the UK might move easier to Northern European countries that speak English well. People from the rest of Europe who have learned some English might prefer to go to the UK, to avoid having to deal with two other languages. I don’t know much about migration and I haven’t checked whether the UK has a higher share of it or not, and whether this language effect really matters. Given the role in the discussion it obviously would be a relevant contingency. Perhaps the UK and Ireland might claim a special position because of the language effect, and this might encourage other countries to switch to English too. But I haven’t looked into this.

The other elephant in the room

The other elephant in the room is my own analysis in political economy. It provides an amendment to Thompson’s analysis.

  • DRGTPE provides for a resolution of the Great Stagflation that we are in.
  • CSBH provides a supplement for the 2007+ crisis situation.
  • The paper Money as gold versus money as water (MGMW) provides an amendment to the theory of the optimal currency area: when each nation has its own Economic Supreme Court then countries might achieve the kind of co-ordination that is required. This is still a hypothesis but the EU has the option of integration, break up, or try such rational hypotheses. (The Van Rompuy roadmap might speed up integration too much with risk of a break-up.)

The main idea in DRGTPE was available in 1990 with the collection of background papers in 1992 (published by Guido den Broeder of Magnana Mu). Thus the EU might have had a different approach to EMU. The later edition of DRGTPE contains a warning about financial risk that materialised in 2007+. CSBH and MGMW provide a solution approach for the current problems.

If the EU would adopt such policies then there would be much less migration, since people would tend to prefer to remain at home (which is why I regard migration as a secondary issue and less in need for studying).

If the EU and UK would adopt such policies then there might still be Brexit or Bregret. Thus UK politicians might still prefer what they are now trying to find out what they prefer.

Conclusion

My impression is that the above gives a clear structural explanation for the UK decision for Brexit and an indication what contingent events were relevant. Knowing what caused helps to identify a cure. It is remarkable how large the role of denial in all of this is. Perhaps this story about the polar bear provides a way to deal with this huge denial (as polar elephants a.k.a. mammoths are already extinct).

Jacob Rees-Mogg had a talk for the Oxford Union, published on YouTube on 2013-11-11. The Oxford Union is a debating society. A debater’s aim is to win the audience over and not necessarily to discuss truth. Rees-Mogg had an entertaining talk but it is not targeted at discerning truth indeed. His presentation comes across as modest and forceful, with the charm of perhaps some old-fashioned style. Who closely considers his words may however be shocked by the unreasonableness and closed-mindedness.

Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage have been criticised for spreading false arguments for the June 23 2016 Brexit referendum. Obviously, these two individuals cannot be held accountable for swinging the views of some 45 million voters. I wondered since the referendum whether they had had some help. Apparently Jacob Rees-Mogg had been giving a helping hand.

To clarify Rees-Mogg’s departure from truth, we first must mention some properties of the European Parliament.

Seat-to-vote ratio’s in the EU parliament

The EU Parliament has 751 seats, distributed over 28 member states with 500 million people. The distribution over countries is not proportional to the populations, since countries are units by themselves, and it is felt that this should have some effect. Thus Germany with its population of 82 million has 96 seats (1.17 seats per million), the UK with its population of 65 million has 73 seats (1.12 seats per million), and Malta with its population of 0.5 million has 6 seats (12 seats per million). There is relatively little tension about this apportionment, since the countries fall in comparable classes (large, medium, very small), and the major political differences translate into political parties. The divisions between Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and what have you, apparently are dispersed over countries in similar manner, or, the political parties are able to create alliances over nations. It is part of the wonder of the EU that nationalism is being channeled and that there is more scope for civil democracy. A recent paper of mine on proportional representation is here.

Jacob Rees-Mogg’s quote on Malta

Jacob Rees-Mogg does not explain above democratic solution for dealing with Member States of different sizes. He criticises the EU that Malta is over-represented compared to the UK. It is a fact that Malta has a higher seat-to-vote ratio, but only pointing to this fact obscures the other considerations. He mentions a perhaps older figure of 15 instead of the current 11, but that is irrelevant here. The demagoguery is that many in his audience apparently are not be aware of the key notions in this apportionment, and he apparently takes advantage of their lack of knowledge to win them over to his own closed-mindedness. The demagoguery is that he creates a suggestion as if Malta has 15 times more influence than the UK, as if 6 is 15 times larger than 73 (as, indeed, 6 = 15 * 73).

The quote at the final minute starting at about 11.30 is, with the abusive “proportionally outvote” and the threat of “spectres”:

“So what is this great experiment doing ? It is helping once again the rise of the extreme right, and in some cases the extreme left. That is the threat to democracy that is there, that is coming, that is deeply destructive. But the fundamental problem, the real issue at hand tonight is that there is less democracy in this country, because of the European Union. Because, Ladies and Gentlemen, however you vote the next general election, 60% of our laws, and some say higher, is made on the basis of European agreements, where the Maltese proportionally outvote us 15 to 1. Whoever you vote for, matters less than somebody in Malta votes for, about the laws of our country. And if you are unsatisfied with that, and you want it changed, I cannot give you any redress, because the United Kingdom Parliament, the most ancient democratic Parliament in the world, has been made powerless. That is the threat to democracy. It is here, but it is on the continent as well. It is a frightening spectre. The best way to deal with it, is to deal with our relationship with the European Union, to put our own democracy first and foremost, and hope that others follow.”

Does it really require a protest ?

It is almost silly to protest to this demagoguery:

  • The situation w.r.t. the UK and Malta in the EU Parliament has been explained.
  • The UK has District Representation (DR) instead of Proportional Representation (PR), which causes that the UK is much less democratic than most countries in the EU or the EU Parliament itself. The PR Gini for the UK of 2017 is 15.6%, but there has been a lot of strategic voting, so that we don’t really know what the first preferences of UK voters are. By comparison, Holland has a PR Gini of only 3.6%, and people in Holland could vote for the party of their first choice. See this weblog text and this paper.
  • I tend to think that Rees-Mogg really worries about the state of democracy, while A.C. Grayling rather sees an elitist or even pecunary motive, see this article, as in “follow the money”. Yet Rees-Mogg doesn’t study the topic, and thus he is condemned to repeat an ideology. He studied history but not science. His voting track record apparently shows that he consistently voted against Proportional Representation. Old-fashioned hypocrisy apparently is also part of his old-fashioned style.

Malta enlarged some 30 x UK, dotted with 15 x UK. Spot the Real Malta

October 18: In memoriam Daphne Caruana Galizia (1964 – 2017), journalist, killed by a car bomb.

This weblog entry copies the earlier entry that used an estimate.
Now we use the actual YouGov data, below.
Again we can thank YouGov and Anthony Wells for making these data available.
The conclusions do not change, since the estimate apparently was fairly good.
It concerns a very relevant poll, and it is useful to have the uncertainty of the estimate removed.

The earlier discussion on Proportional Representation versus District Representation has resulted in these two papers:

Brexit stands out as a disaster of the UK First Past The Post (FPTP) system and the illusion that one can use referenda to repair disproportionalities caused by FPTP. This information about the real cause of Brexit is missing in the otherwise high quality overview at the BBC.

The former weblog text gave an overview of the YouGov polling data of June 12-13 2017 on the Great Britain (UK minus Northern Ireland) preference orderings on Brexit. The uncertainty of the estimate is removed now, and we are left with the uncertainty because of having polling data. The next step is to use these orderings for the various voting philosophies. I will be using the website of Rob LeGrand since this makes for easy communication. See his description of the voting philosophies. Robert Loring has a website that referred to LeGrand, and Loring is critical about FPTP too. However, I will use the general framework of my book “Voting theory for democracy” (VTFD), because there are some general principles that many people tend to overlook.

Input format

See the former entry for the problem and the excel sheet with the polling data of the preferences and their weights. LeGrand’s website requires us to present the data in a particular format. It seems best to transform the percentages into per-millions, since that website seems to require integers and we want some accuracy even though polling data come with uncertainty. There are no preferences with zero weights. Thus we get 24 nonzero weighted options. We enter those and then click on the various schemes. See the YouGov factsheet for the definition of the Brexit options, but for short we have R = Remain, S = Soft / Single Market, T = Tariffs / Hard, N = No Deal / WTO. Observe that the Remain options are missing, though these are important too.

248485:R>S>T>N
38182:R>S>N>T
24242:R>T>S>N
19394:R>T>N>S
12727:R>N>S>T
10909:R>N>T>S
50303:S>R>T>N
9091:S>R>N>T
22424:S>T>R>N
66667:S>T>N>R
9091:S>N>R>T
36364:S>N>T>R
6667:T>R>S>N
3636:T>R>N>S
12121:T>S>R>N
46667:T>S>N>R
15758:T>N>R>S
135152:T>N>S>R
9697:N>R>S>T
9091:N>R>T>S
8485:N>S>R>T
37576:N>S>T>R
16970:N>T>R>S
150303:N>T>S>R

Philosophy 1. Pareto optimality

The basic situation in voting has a Status Quo. The issue on the table is that we consider alternatives to the Status Quo. Only those options are relevant that are Pareto Improving, i.e. that some advance while none lose. Commonly there are more Pareto options, whence there is a deadlock that Pareto itself cannot resolve, and then majority voting might be used to break the deadlock. Many people tend to forget that majority voting is mainly a deadlock breaking rule. For it would not be acceptable when a majority would plunder a minority. The Pareto condition thus gives the minority veto rights against being plundered.

(When voting for a new Parliament then it is generally considered no option to leave the seats empty, whence there would be no status quo. A situation without a status quo tends to be rather exceptional.)

In this case the status quo is that the UK is a member of the EU. The voters for R block a change. The options S, T and N do not compensate the R. Thus the outcome remains R.

This is the fundamental result. The philosophies in the following neglect the status quo and thus should not really be considered.

PM 1. Potentially though, the S, T and N options must be read such that the R will be compensated for their loss.

PM 2. Potentially though, Leavers might reason that the status quo concerns national sovereignty, that the EU breaches upon. The BBC documentary “Europe: ‘Them’ or ‘Us’” remarkably explains that it was Margaret Thatcher who helped abolish the UK veto rights and who accepted EU majority rule, and who ran this through UK Parliament without proper discussion. There seems to be good reason to return to unanimity rule in the EU, yet it is not necessarily a proper method to neglect the rights of R. (And it was Thatcher who encouraged the neoliberal economic policies that many UK voters complain about as if these would come from the EU.)

Philosophy 2. Plurality

On LeGrand’s site we get Plurality as the first step in the Hare method. gets 35% while the other options are divided with each less than 35%. Thus the outcome is R.

(The Brexit referendum question in 2016 was flawed in design e.g. since it hid the underlying disagreements, and collected all dissent into a single Leave, also sandwiching R between various options for Leave.)

Philosophy 3. Hare, or Instant Run-off, a form of Single Transferable Vote (STV)

When we continue with Hare, then R remains strong and it collects votes when S and N drop off (as it is curiously sandwiched between options for Leave). Eventually R gets 45.0% and T gets 55.0%. Observe that this poll was on June 12-13 2017, and that some 25% of the voters “respect” the 2016 referendum outcome that however was flawed in design. I haven’t found information about preference orderings at the time of the referendum.

Philosophy 4. Borda

Borda generates the collective ranking S > T > R > N. This is Case 9 in the original list, and fortunately this is single-peaked.

Philosophy 5. Condorcet (Copeland)

Using Copeland, we find that S is also the Condorcet winner, i.e. wins from each other option in pairwise contests. This means that S is also the Borda Fixed Point winner.

Conclusions

The major point of this discussion is that the status quo consists of the UK membership of the EU. Part of the status quo is that the UK may leave by invoking article 50. However, the internal process that caused the invoking of article 50 leaves much to be desired. Potentially many voters got the suggestion as if they might vote about membership afresh without the need to compensate those who benefit from Remain.

Jonathan Portes suggested in 2016 that the Brexit referendum question was flawed in design because there might be a hidden Condorcet cycle. The YouGov poll didn’t contain questions that allows to check this, also because much has happened in 2016-2017, including the misplaced “respect” by 25% of the voters for the outcome of a flawed referendum. A key point is that options for Remain are not included, even though they would be relevant. My impression is that the break-up of the UK would be a serious issue, even though, curiously, many Scots apparently rather prefer the certainty of the closeness to a larger economy of the UK rather than the uncertainties of continued membership of the EU when the UK is Leaving.

It would make sense for the EU to encourage a reconsideration within the UK about what people really want. The Large Hadron Collider is expensive, but comparatively it might be less expensive when the UK switches to PR, splits up its confused parties (see this discussion by Anthony Wells), and has a new vote for the House of Commons. The UK already has experience with PR namely for the EU Parliament, and it should not be too complex to use this approach also for the nation.

Such a change might make it also more acceptable for other EU member states if the UK would Breget. Nigel Farage much benefited from Proportional Representation (PR) in the EU Parliament, and it would be welcome if he would lobby for PR in the UK too.

Nevertheless, given the observable tendency in the UK to prefer a soft Brexit, the EU would likely be advised to agree with such an outcome, or face a future with a UK that rightly or wrongly feels quite maltreated. As confused as the British have been on Brexit, they might also be sensitive to a “stab-in-the-back myth”.